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The use of nuclear explosives for the excavation of harbors
offers tremendous opportunities to create greatly improved and much
needed harbor facilities that will benefit all of mankind. Present-
day harbors have two distinct deficiencies: 1) there are not enough
of them to provide for mankind's demands and 2) not all of them are
located in the most desirable places. There are areas of the world
that could realize great economic development with adequate harbor
facilities. Such areas include the west coast of Africa, Australia,
and South America. These coasts, for example, adjoin areas of
extensive mineral resources and some of the world's most fertile
fishing grounds. Well-placed harbors could open these regions to
development, but in many cases only nuclear explosives are powerful
and economical enough to do the required work.
There are, however, limitations on the use of nuclear explosives
for construction purposes. A nuclear detonation near the ground
surface involves much more than merely producing a crater or mound
of rock. The extent and safety implications of the radioactivity,
airblast, and ground shock effects, which are by-products of nuclear
cratering detonations, must be clearly understood and analyzed prior
to a nuclear detonation. Since nuclear explosives have not, to date,
been directly applied to creating a harbor, some research in regard
to radiation hazards is still required. Nevertheless, sufficient
data does exist from other nuclear explosive projects to permit an
analysis of the hazards that can be expected. Radioactivity, airblast,

and ground shock effects will impose definite limitations with regard
to the proximity of the proposed project site to population centers.
By employing adequate safeguards to protect man and his environment
from any possible hazards, nuclear explosives can be used for large
scale harbor excavation projects.
Nuclear construction of harbors will open a new field of
technology for mankind. It will be possible to design and site many
harbors that will best suit his needs without worry of natural
limitations or prohibitive costs. These new harbors, created with
nuclear energy, can be built with a flexibility of design that will
provide safe refuge for ships of all sizes. This is in contrast to
many of the present harbors of the world that nature, at times renders
unsafe for navigation.
The basic concept of nuclear excavation involves the subsurface
detonation of a nuclear explosive to break up and eject large
quantities of rock and/or soil. The primary advantage in using nuclear
methods rather than conventional methods in the construction of a
2
harbor is economy. The nuclear cratering experience to date
indicates that there is a significant potential for using nuclear
explosives to accomplish large scale construction projects at
considerable savings in cost and time as compared to conventional
construction techniques.
A proposed harbor design is presented here with an analysis
of the related safety considerations. Chapter II contains a brief
outline of the various steps required in planning a harbor and how
nuclear explosives may be applicable in harbor construction.

Chapter III discusses the detailed and exhaustive investigations that
must be conducted prior to and after a nuclear detonation in order to
protect both man and his environment from any harmful effects. The
geometric configuration of the proposed harbor is presented In
Chapter IV. The possible radiation hazard and the ground shock and
airblast effects are analyzed in Chapters V and VI, respectively.
Chapter VII contains the costs associated with the size of explosive
charge and its emplacement in the ground. The summary and conclusions
based on this analysis are contained in Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER II
HARBOR PLANNING AND NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION
A, Harbor Planning and Development
The history of harbor construction dates back to ancient times,
3perhaps as early as 3500 B.C. The harbor construction technology
which has evolved through the centuries has been based on some funda-
mental concepts such as availability of manpower and/or equipment, and
the utilization of natural formations where possible to reduce cost.
The utilization of nuclear explosives for harbor excavation will not
change the overall systematic procedure of harbor construction but may
allow more flexibility in siting. No longer will areas be discounted
because of geological formations that would make the cost of excavation
prohibitive. Close proximity of population centers, however, may
preclude the use of nuclear explosives. For large projects, labor and
equipment considerations will be of less importance in determining
the harbor location. More of the specific advantages of utilizing
nuclear explosives for harbor excavation are discussed in a later
section.
The systematic procedure of constructing harbors is well
established, therefore, only a brief outline is presented. A harbor
is a water area partially enclosed and so protected from storms as to
provide safe and suitable accommodation for vessels seeking refuge,
3
supplies, refueling, repairs or the transfer of cargo. Harbors
may be classified as: 1) natural, semi-natural or artificial, and
2) as harbors of refuge, military harbors, or commercial harbors.

Attention here will be focused on construction of artificial or semi-
natural harbors.
The basic procedure in the planning and development of a harbor
3
can be catagorized as follows:
1. Project Proposal . The decision to build a port, and its
location, generally will be determined by factors having to do
with:
a) its need and economic justification; b) prospective
volume of seaborne commerce; and c) availability of inland
communications by both land and water.
2. Preliminary Planning . After general location of the harbor
has been established, as well as its principal use, the next
step will be to make preliminary studies and layouts of the
port in preparation for making a complete site investigation
to gather all the information which will be needed in making
the final design of the port.
Information for this preliminary planning in the United
States can be obtained from such sources as: U . S. Department
of Commerce, The Navy Department, The U. S. Corps of Engineers.
All of these agencies have surveyed a great many of our
navigable waters. Most charts of this survey data can be
obtained from the U. S. Government Printing Office. These
charts give information on the depth of water, bottom features
and range of tides. Meteorological data on winds, temperatures,
and rainfall are published by the U. S. Weather Bureau.
If the port is located in some part of the country or
world where this information is not available, it will be

necessary to make a preliminary site reconnaissance. Aerial
photographs are a quick and convenient way of obtaining
topography.
3, Harbor Layout . This step is to make preliminary studies
of the harbor and port layout. This will usually be supplemented
with approximate cost estimates based on certain assumptions
which will have to be verified when making the site investi-
gation.
A. Site Investigation . Unless the site is fixed by specific
requirements of the port, several possible locations of the
harbor will have to be studied to determine the most protected
location. The location selected should involve the least
amount of dredging and the most favorable bottom conditions
as well as a shore area suitable for the development of the
terminal facilities.
It may be impossible to fulfill all of the above
conditions, as one or more may predominate to the exclusion
of others. As mentioned before, nuclear explosives will offer
a great degree of latitude in siting. As an example, consider
the nuclear crater, which, in addition to creating an
excavation of the required depth, results in the formation of
a crater lip which may function as a breakwater to protect the
harbor area from wave action. Other advantages of nuclear
explosives as they relate to siting flexibility are discussed
later.
5. Size and Shape of Harbor and Turning Basin . The number and
size of ships using a harbor will determine its size to a large

extent, but existing site conditions will also have an important
influence. Generally speaking, unless the harbor is a natural
one, its size will be kept as small as will permit safe and
reasonably comfortable operations to take place.
6. Type
,
Location and Height of Breakwaters . Breakwaters are
required for the protection of artificial and semi-natural
harbors. Their location and extent will depend upon the
direction of the maximum waves, the configuration of the shore
line, and the minimum size of harbor required for the antici-
pated traffic in the port. Rarely will a location be found
where the waves are from one direction only. Generally, it
will be better in a harbor having two openings for the ships
to enter from the direction of the minimum wind and waves and
to leave toward the direction of the maximum wind and waves.
This is because upon leaving a harbor, the ship usually has the
freedom of open water in which to maneuver, whereas upon
entering the harbor, it must approach the docks at a reduced
speed
.
7. Location and Width of Entrance to Harbor . In order to
reduce the wave height within the harbor, entrances should be
no wider than necessary to provide safe navigation and to
prevent dangerous currents when the tide is coming in and
going out. The entrance width should be in proportion to the
size of the harbor and the ships using it. In general, these
entrance widths will vary from 300 to 800 feet.
8. Depth of Harbor and Approach Channel . For ideal operating
conditions, the water in the approach channel, in the entrance

8and in the harbor should be of sufficient depth to permit
navigation at the lowest low water when the ship is fully
loaded. This depth must include an allowance for the surge
of the ship, which is about one-half the wave height, the out
of trim or squat when in motion, and from 2 to 4 feet clearance
under the keel, the larger figure being used when the bottom
is of hard material such as rock.
Until recent years, a harbor depth of 35 to 40 feet
would have taken care of most ships. With the advent of the
supertanker, however, with a dead-weight tonnage of 84,000 to
500,000 tons and a draft of 47 to 50 feet, new problems are
presented in harbor design. To date, the approach to these
problems has been one of the following:
a. The use of submarine lines and an offshore anchorage
in water 55 to 60 feet in depth.
b. The transfer of part of the load to smaller
tankers in deep water.
c. The construction of a special deep-water unloading
terminal. Here again, there exists a tremendous
opportunity in the application of nuclear explosives
for an economical solution to these problems.
9c Construction of Related Harbor Facilities . The last step
in the sequence of designing and building a harbor is the
provision for all related facilities. These related facilities
include docks, piers, warehouses, navigation lights and
related markings, bulk storage facilities, terminal buildings
and other miscellaneous buildings. The area comprising a port

or falling within its jurisdiction will vary with the nature
and tonnage of the cargo to be handled and the services to be
provided at the port. The area may vary from less than 1
square mile to over 1,400 square miles as for the Port of New
York.
Probably no single factor has contributed so much to
placing the design of harbors on a sound engineering basis as
has the testing of hydraulic models. The hydraulic laboratory
of the Waterways Experiment Station at Vicksburg, Mississippi,
and The NEYRPTIC Hydraulic Laboratory at Grenoble, France,
have performed numerous model investigations on outstanding
harbors , This technology should supplement the nuclear
cratering technology, as it applies to harbor excavation, which
is being developed by the Atomic Energy Commission under its
Plowshare Program.
B. Engineering Characteristics of Nuclear Excavations
Nuclear excavation involves the detonation of one or more
nuclear charges to provide a crater or a ditch for the appropriate
purpose. The Atomic Energy Commission has conducted several tests
under the Plowshare Program in developing the phenomenology of nuclear
craters. These tests have helped to answer the following questions
which are necessary for the development of this technology:
1. How does crater size depend on geologic properties?
2. Can data on crater size, seismic effects, acoustic waves,
and radioactivity distribution of low-yield experiments
be extended to yields in the megaton range?
3. How do nuclear charges in a row interact?
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In order to become proficient at excavating in various earth materials
with nuclear energy, the mechanisms of excavation at very large
yields must be known. Specific information will be needed which
includes the optimum depth of burst (D.O.B.) for various media, proper
spacing of line charges, and the spatial distribution of excavated
material.
The extensive testing already conducted by the AEC has provided
a great deal of information on cratering techniques and the characteristics
of nuclear excavations. When a nuclear charge is detonated at or near
the ground surface, it produces a crater by the tremendous energy
release of the explosion by the processes of crushing, compaction,
2
plastic deformation spalling and gas acceleration. The pressures
(up to millions of atmospheres) generate a shock wave which propagates
as a high pressure discontinuity. This shock front transfers energy
to the medium and, in turn, alters the physical characteristics of
the medium. The pressure spectrum in the immediate vicinity of the
explosion is sufficiently high to vaporize and melt the material as
the shock wave passes through it. When the pressure level exceeds
the dynamic crushing strength of the material, there results crushing,
heating and physical displacement. This entire process lasts for
only a fraction of a second.
The next important crater-producing process is designated as
spalling. When the compressive wave which propagates outward from the
detonation encounters the ground surface, two reflected pulses are
generated - a tensile pulse and a shear stress pulse. The tensile
pulse is able to break off a mass of material and impart a
characteristic velocity due to the energy trapped in it. Successive
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masses of material will break away until a plane is reached where the
tensile stress becomes smaller than the tensile strength of the
material c Spalling of the free surface is one of the most important
phenomena in cratering and appears to be the dominant process in a
shallow explosion.
The gas acceleration is a long-period process which imparts
motion to the material around the explosion by the adiabatic expansion
of gasses trapped in the cavity produced. This gas imparts an
appreciable acceleration to the overlying material during its escape
through cracks extending from the cavity to the surface. Great
quantities of the overlying material will fall back into the cavity
(which help to trap most of the radioactive material) and the rest is
thrown clear and forms the crater lip. The size of the crater
produced depends upon the yield of the explosion and the depth of
burst.
In order to predict the dimensions of a crater and the effects
associated with a nuclear explosive, scaling laws can be employed
which relate the effects of small cratering explosions to those of
larger yield. The AEC has made great strides in developing these
scaling laws. The Plowshare Program has carried out experiments
with chemical explosives ranging from 250 lbs. to 500 tons. These
detonations were carried out in single events with spherical
configuration and centrally ignited to simulate nuclear explosives.
Scaling laws were then established for chemical explosives over the
experimental range of yield use, which covers a factor of 4000 in
energy. Nuclear explosive tests were then conducted and the results




crater diameter and depth to be proportional to W , where W is
the yield in kilotons (kt) , and the crater dimensions are also
dependent on the depth of burst.
Although there is presently much information available on nuclear
cratering technology, future experiments will be required to provide
data on scaling criteria for larger yields, crater dimensions in
various hard rocks (where most practical civil applications will be
considered) and the features of nuclear row charges. It should also
be pointed out that more information is required on underwater
cratering such as the effect of a large water layer over the
detonation area and the stability of crater slopes so produced.
Detailed plans were developed to conduct a major underwater excavation
experiment (CHARIOT) in 1960 on the northwest coast of Alaska. This
plan was to construct a harbor and entrance channel using one 200-kt
and a row of four 20-kt explosions. This would have been an excellent
experiment and the first using a row of nuclear charges to make a
channel. However, it was successively delayed throughout the nuclear
test moratorium and now has been largely overtaken by factors such as
public opinion. Much valuable information has been obtained on the
4
features of a nuclear row charge detonation from project BUGGY
(March 1968). This test consisted of the simultaneous detonation
of five 1.2-kt devices, resulting in a crater 900 feet long, 250 feet
wide and 60 feet deep.
From this brief discussion of the characteristics of nuclear
excavated craters, it can be seen that nuclear energy can provide a
tremendous improvement to man's construction capabilities. Nuclear
energy will enable man to accomplish construction projects never
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before thought possible. Of course, careful planning and the
strictest procedures will have to be employed and followed when
undertaking an excavation project utilizing nuclear explosives in
order to ensure that there is no undue risk, to the health and safety
of the public. Some of the hazards associated with the use of nuclear
explosives such as shock wave damage and radiation fallout are
discussed in later sections.
C. Nuclear Explosive Applications To Harbor Construction
The greatest advantage of using nuclear explosives for harbor
excavation is the flexibility provided in siting. This is due to the
fact that nuclear explosions can produce an exonomical excavation in
4
hard rock as well as in soft sediment. With this added flexibility,
harbors can be located without geologic restrictions and it will not
be necessary to depend on natural formations to make them economical
or navigationally safe. Many harbors of the world today are located
at the mouth of a large river and consequently are plagued by sedimen-
tation which contributes greatly to high maintenance costs. With the
freedom of siting offered by nuclear explosives, harbors could be
built that are virtually free from sediment.
Without question, sedimentation is the single most important
factor in the configuration, limitation of draft of ships, and cost
9
of harbor development and maintenance. This then points up another
possible advantage of the nuclear constructed harbor: that even if
the initial costs of the nuclear harbor are higher, it may well be
more economical in the long run when considering this increased
maintenance cost for dredging.
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Conventional harbors may also have other serious defects. The
entrances to many harbors are often impassable because of the
breaking swell in the outer harbor. Ice and log flotsam, nipa rafts
(floating vegetation), tidal floods, surging and seiching (surface
oscillations) are other troublesome, dangerous or crippling conditions
of conventional harbors. Ice forms more readily on fresh or brackish
water than on sea water because of the stabilities and temperatures
involved. Floods can carry ships out of control and rapidly alter
channels. An inspection of the harbors of the world reveals few
that are immune to many of these undesirable characteristics. There
are, however, several naturally occurring harbors of the world that
are free from many of these ills. These harbors can be studied to
determine their characteristics, and with the use of nuclear explosives
it may well be possible to incorporate their best features in future
harbor construction.
Other steps in the planning and development of a harbor that
will be influenced by the use of nuclear explosives will be the
harbor layout and site investigation. No longer will the natural
formations dictate the harbor layout nor will the bottom geology
play such an important role in site selection. As was previously
mentioned, the nuclear excavated crater embodies a lip that will
assist in acting as a breakwater for the harbor protection. This
crater lip may suffice as a breakwater or may be incorporated as the
foundation for a breakwater. In any event, this lip will play an




SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND SITE INVESTIGATIONS
A. Safety Programs
Prior to assessing the engineering feasibility of using
nuclear explosives for construction at a particular site, certain
elements must be thoroughly investigated. Nuclear explosives possess
the capability of drastically altering the physical, chemical, and
biological properties of the surrounding media, including the plant
and animal life. It is, therefore, necessary to know precisely
what effects will be caused by a nuclear detonation in order to ensure
that there will be no undue risk to the health and safety of the
public.
The Nevada Operations Office of the Atomic Energy Commission
has at present a prime responsibility for the execution and safety
of all underground nuclear detonations carried out by the United
States Government. The detonation of a nuclear device can never
be assumed to be free from danger or risk. A definition of safety
which reflects the philosophy of the Nevada Operations Office is:
A nuclear device can be detonated safely when it is
ascertained that the detonation can be accomplished
without injury to people, either directly or indirectly,
and without unacceptable damage to the ecological
system and natural and man-made structures.
Potential hazards should be investigated and plans and safety
procedures put into effect well before and continued long after a
nuclear detonation. This is necessary to assure the safety of all
personnel and property both on and off site. The NVOO has developed
two programs to ensure that all detonations are conducted in
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accordance with the concept. The first program is associated with the
safety measures taken at the time of a detonation. The second program
involves the long-range studies and is a continuous effort to expand
the understanding of event-related phenomena. The specific safety
programs carried out by NVOO include:
1. Geologic considerations
2. Hydrologic considerations
3. Radionuclide migration in ground water
4. Ground motion and structural response
5. Mine and well inspection program
6. Meteorology considerations
7. Bioenvironmental safety
The reader is referred to the "Technical Discussions of Offsite Safety
Programs for Underground Nuclear Detonations" NVO-40, May 1969 for
further understanding of the scope of these safety programs. Special
emphasis should be placed on the area of radiological safety since
this is the subject about which the least information is known in terms
of long range effects on man. It is difficult to predict the
distribution of radioactive particles or the dose levels that result
from a nuclear explosion. Particles can collect on dust and be carried
by the wind, or they can enter the ground water where they will be
carried away in solution. Because release of radioactivity at any
level is a potential hazard, there must be continuing efforts to reduce
to a minimum the quantities of radioactivities produced and released
to the biosphere. This can be accomplished in several ways, such as;
development of cleaner devices (lower fission/ fusion ratio), entrapment
of the radioactivity underground such as in an excavation explosion,
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detonating the device when winds are away from populated areas, and
evacuation of possible hazard areas until dilution and decay have
reduced the radioactivity level.
Only a small fraction of the total radioactivity escapes from the
explosion of a nuclear charge which is buried at sufficient depth.
Experiments suggest that nearly optimum cratering efficiency can be
attained at D.O.B.'s sufficient to contain over 95% of the gross
radioactivity. In addition, almost all the radioactivity that escapes
adheres to fairly large particles which fall out locally and hence
do not contribute to world-wide contamination. From the technological
viewpoint, scientists are convinced that, while radioactivity cannot
at present be completely eliminated from nuclear cratering explosions,
it can be controlled to the extent that radioactive hazards need not
be an obstable to the industrial exploitation of this technique.
B. Site Characteristic Investigation
In order to ensure a successive safety program and obtain a
reliable engineering feasibility evaluation that will lead to an
economical project design, several categories of on-site data are
required.
1. Topography . Topographic data are needed as input to the
design of a project. The topography may affect the
project location, orientation, or alignment, or access
requirements. The extent of detailed topographic coverage




2. Geology . The physical and chemical properties of the
various geological formations are required to determine
the cratering characteristics of the medium and to predict
the specific radionuclides produced. Knowledge of the
geological medium is also required to predict the
characteristics of seismic propagation,
3. Hydrology
. Hydrological studies are required to assess
the effect on the regional drainage system, to determine
flood control requirements, if pertinent, and to evaluate
the impact of the local hydrology on the redistribution
of radioactivity. Studies of the local precipitation
are required to determine the extent of washing and
leaching of debris and the transport of radioactive
materials by water flow.
4. Hydrography . Bottom contours, bottom geology, littoral
drift, and other hydrographic data are important in the
design of a nuclear excavated harbor or canal project.
5. Meteorology . Meteorological data are required to determine
the probable distribution of radioactive debris. This
data, in the form of fallout patterns, when combined with
hydrologic data, form the basis for the redistribution
studies which are part of the bioenvironmental programs ,
This data is also important in predicting airblast over-
pressures. Since this data leads to the specification of





. Seismic propagation characteristics
are required in order to define the areas in which the
explosion-induced ground motion may constitute a hazard to
existing structures. The results of these analyses are used,
as are the meteorological data, as input to the overall
project safety analysis to determine the maximum yield
which can be safely and economically detonated,
7. Bioenvironmental Conditions ,
a. Terrestrial Studies . These studies will identify the
major environmental features of the project site area
that are of consequence to the safety of indigenous
populations and natural resources located within potentially
significant fallout areas. Included should be an analysis
of any alteration to the land use of the area, and the
resultant consequences to the animal and plant life. A
study of the inhabitants diet and feeding habits of animals
will provide information required to prevent any radio-
nuclides from entering the food chain.
b. Marine Study . Since a nuclear excavated harbor will
involve interaction with the marine environment, studies
must be made concerning the distribution of released
radionuclides in the seas by ocean currents, the deposition
of nuclides through sedimentation processes, and their
redistribution and concentration by marine organisms, with
special reference to species used by man.
8. Medico-ecology . These data are needed to assess the threats
to health that may exist and will influence decisions on
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where and how to displace indigenous personnel. Included
would be data on human diseases, vectors and reservoirs
of disease, venomous or otherwise harmful or dangerous forms
of animal life, poisonous and hazardous plants, and other






As stated before, the number and size of ships using a harbor
will determine its size to a large extent, but existing site conditions
will also have an important influence. This design is based on a
3
medium size harbor that will accommodate approximately twelve large
ships with a length of 800 to 1000 feet and the harbor depth will be
no less than 200 feet. The harbor is designed for construction in
a hard rock medium.
A. Nuclear Crater Dimensions
The basic concept of a nuclear excavated harbor involves the
subsurface detonation of nuclear explosives to break up and eject
large quantities of rock and/or soil in order to produce an excavation
of the desired size. When a nuclear charge is detonated at or near
the ground surface, it produces a crater with distinct characteristics
as shown in Figure IV. 1.
By carefully engineering the spacing and depth of burial of the
nuclear explosives, an excavation of optimum size will be produced.
In this design of a nuclear excavated harbor, advantage is taken of
the characteristic crater lip to act as a breakwater that completely
encloses the harbor for protection from the sea. The height of this
crater lip and the diameter of the crater are of primary concern in
determining the yield size to be used and the positioning of charges.
The depth of a nuclear crater is approximately one-half the radius












R - Radius of apparent crater
measured at preshot surface
datum
Radius of apparent lip crest
Radius of outer boundary of
continuous ejecta
R - Radius of true crater measured
on preshot ground surface
R - Radius of explosion-produced
cavity
D - Maximum depth of apparent
crater below and normal to
preshot ground surface
- Apparent crater lip crest
height above preshot
ground surface
- True crater lip crest
height above preshot
ground surface
- Depth of burst (distance
to ZP from SGZ, or from




SGZ - Surface Ground Zero
(point on surface
vertically above ZP)







Figure IV. 1 Dimensional data for single-charge and row craters
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for safe navigation will be achieved as shown later.
Figure IV. 1 shows the cross section of a typical nuclear crater
and the adjacent zones of disturbance. The crater dimensional data
used in this analysis together with accompanying symbols and definitions
are also shown. There are basically two approaches that have been
developed to date for predicting crater dimensions. One approach
involves the use of computer calculations of the mound and cavity
growth used in conjunction with a free-fall throw-out model. The
second approach, and the one used in this analysis, involves empirical
scaling relationships which relate the crater dimensions for some
reference energy to crater dimensions for any energy yield.
The size of the crater produced for any given yield varies
with the geologic medium in which the detonation occurs. In general,
a detonation in dry soil will result in a crater that is the same
depth but has a somewhat larger radius than the same detonation in
hard rock, assuming both are detonated at the optimum depth of
burial. For depths of burst slightly greater than optimum, the
crater dimensions rapidly go to zero for hard rock. This phenomena
can be seen on the scaling curves in Figures A-l and A-2, Appendix A,
For this analysis, a hard-rock medium is assumed as opposed
to a soil medium. A rock medium is much better suited to nuclear
excavation techniques than soil because of the more difficult
problems of stability to be encountered in a soil excavation. The
slope stability is of the utmost concern in a nuclear excavated harbor
if the harbor is to withstand the errosive effects of the sea.
At present, some uncertainties exist as to the proper scaling
of under-sea-floor explosions, however, it can be assumed that there
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would be a wider, shallower crater formed than for the same detonation
4
in dry land. Since the scaling relationships used in this design are
based on hard, dry rock, the predicted crater dimensions will be
somewhat conservative.
From Figure A-l, a crater cross section can be developed for a
one kiloton yield as shown in Figure IV. 2. Dimensions shown in this
1/3 4figure are in feet/kiloton . Dimensions for craters produced by
explosives with yields other than one kiloton can be obtained by
multiplying the dimensions shown by the 1/3.4 power of the yield in
kilotons. Table IV. 1 lists the characteristic crater measurements of
interest for various yields.
B. Harbor Configuration
From Table IV. 1, a judgement can be made as to the appropriate
explosive size, or combination of explosives, that would be required
to produce any desired harbor dimensions, within the range shown.
For comparison of various harbor sizes that will result, four cases
of four charges each will be investigated. Each case consists of
a larger charge, that is to create the outer turning basin of the
harbor, and three smaller charges that will produce the docking area.
The charge emplacement pattern and the predicted harbor geometry
are shown in Table IV. 2 along with the dimensions associated with
each case. The spacing of the B charges, of 1.2 times the apparent
crater radius, is based on the conclusions of the plowshare experience
to date with row charges. This spacing will result in a ditch with
dimensions approximately equal to those expected from a single crater.
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portion of the row crater, however, will be relatively higher than
would result in a single charge. This is because the crater ejecta
from the linear region of a row-charge are constrained to move
laterally to the sides, rather than in all directions as in the case
of a single crater. The length of this B charge row (L ), called the
inner harbor length, can be expressed by
1/3.
A
1/3 h 1/3 U
L. = 2(1.2 x 150 W ' ) + 2(150 w ' ) = 660 w '
where W is the B charge yield in kilotons. The charges are to be
located at a distance from the shore-line such that this ejecta
lip can be used to backfill to the shore in order to provide area for
ship off-loading, cargo handling and storage facilities.
The location of the larger A charge is such that the resulting
harbor configuration will provide the optimum harbor area for ease of
ship maneuverability, particularly for the piers near the ends of the
harbor. This is done by requiring the circumference of the larger
crater to intersect the smaller row crater at a point where the
linear portion of the B charge row would begin. From the geometry
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1
It is assumed that the net effect of these four charges will
by such that there will be no mound of ejecta in the center of the
harbor, or at least it will not form to within 100 feet of the surface.
The fall-back in this area should settle toward the deepest parts of
the A and B craters. Should this not be the case, and there results
a mound in the center of the harbor, that would present a hazard to
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navigation, it could easily be dredged away by conventional methods
since it will be fall-back material that has been crushed and shattered
by the explosion. Another alternative would be to excavate the harbor
in increments. The B charges could be detonated in the first increment
and then, at a later date when the radiation level has decreased to
permit safe reentry, the A charge could be detonated. Safe reentry
times are calculated in Section V.
The resulting harbor, scaled for Case 1, is shown in Plan View
and Cross Section in Figures IV. 3 and IV. 4, respectively,
C. Throwout Lip and Slope Stability
The throwout lip is composed of the material which is ejected
from the crater. This material falls on the upheaved true lip of
the crater and out to a distance determined by the trajectories of the
material. The combined true and ejecta lips make up the apparent lip
of the crater. From Table IV. 2, the apparent lip height for the 2 mt
A charge of Case 1 is 350 feet. This is the predicted height above
surface ground zero (ocean floor). From Figure IV t 4, it is seen that
this outer lip could be located as much as 5500 feet from the shore
line. For an average bottom slope of 4%, the water depth at this point
would be around 200 to 250 feet. The apparent lip then could be
expected to rise above the mean water level by approximately 100 feet.
This hypothetical average bottom slope of 4% is used for
illustration purposes only and is actually quite steep for very near
the coast. In reality, the continental shelfs of most parts of the





























































The fallback slope on the inner side of the crater is similar
to a talus slope, composed of broken material and concave upward, with
4
the flattest portion near the base. The angle of the steepest portion
of the fallback slope is usually less than the angle of repose of the
material. The material is thinnest where the slope is steepest. In
effect, the head of the slope has little overburden and the toe of the
slope is reinforced, which aids slope stability. The question of slope
stability is one of the most important problems associated with the
use of nuclear explosives for excavation purposes.
Present knowledge on the stability of crater slopes is somewhat
9
meager. However, data from the Sedan and Danny Boy investigations,
together with theoretical studies and experiences with conventional
excavations, permit some insight into this problem. The Sedan crater,
which was excavated in desert alluvium, has an average slope of 38
degrees for the material above the fallback which includes the in-
situ soils and ejecta forming the crater rim. The average angle
of internal friction of the in-situ soils is 43 degrees and ignoring
the effects of cementation gives a factor of safety of 1,19 for
relatively stable slopes. In assessing the stability of the Sedan
slopes, the geology and environmental conditions of the area must be
kept in mind if this data is to be used properly in estimating slope
stability of excavations in other soil and climatic environments.
A massive rock with a random joint pattern has an angle of
9
repose of about 70 degrees. Consequently, rock slopes in nuclear
craters may be stable at this angle; although if the rock is great.
fragmented, this angle may be as low as 45 degrees. The safe angle of
repose of stratified rock may range between 30 and 90 degrees,
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depending on the inclination of the bedding planes. No information
is available yet on cratering in stratified materials in which the
bedding planes are not parallel to the ground surface. However, in
such cases stable slopes might be realized on one side of a harbor
while unstable slopes would be present on the other.
In assessing the long-term slope stability of a nuclear
excavated harbor, consideration must be given to the effects of wave
action and ocean currents on the slopes. The effects of waves and
ocean currents on seawalls and breakwaters is well documented and much
of this technology can be used in determining the effects on crater
slopes. Generally, a rubble mound breakwater consists of a large
mass of stone so arranged that the smaller sizes form the lower central
portion of the core and are protected by the larger stones forming the
exterior slopes and upper portion, the latter being most severely
exposed to direct wave action.
The size of stone used and the breakwater slope depend on the
water depth and the height of the waves. Roughly, the larger stones
range from A to 27 tons with slopes of 1 on 1-1/4 to 1 on 3, The outer
crater slope, which will be subjected to the most severe wave action,
varies from 1 on 4 to 1 on 5, The ejected rock sizes on the outer
crater slope in a hard rock medium will range up to 2 or 3 tons with
25 percent of the rock being greater than 1 ton.
Initially there will be some errosions of the crater slopes
as the smaller particles are dispersed and the larger rocks seek more
stable positions. However, with time, the slopes should become stable
and depending on the geologic medium and the characteristic wave
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action of the area, additional rock could be placed on the slopes






This section discusses the nature, extent, and safety
implications of the radioactivity produced by the subsurface detonation
of nuclear explosives, A radiological safety analysis must be made
for any proposed nuclear construction project to ensure that the
radioactivity released to the environment does not reach man in
amounts that will cause harmful effects.
This safety analysis is subdivided into three major areas
of concern: on-site ground contamination of the crater and lip area,
off-site ground contamination in the downwind fallout pattern due to
passage of the radioactive cloud (local fallout), and on site
water contamination due to tritium production in the thermonuclear
explosion. Figure V.l outlines the scope of a radiological safety
analysis. For each of these three areas, a comparison will be made
of the effects caused by each of the four different combinations of
yield sizes described in Section IV<
This radiological safety analysis assumes that all charges
1/3.4
are at a scaled depth of burst of 145 ft/Kt ' . The procedures
followed throughout this section are based primarily on the methods
developed by the U. S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group.
Included are the local fallout prediction and determination of the
exclusion area and safe reentry times. The primary control measures
to ensure public safety are: 1) evacuation of personnel from possible
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contaminated areas after the detonation to determine additional
evacuation requirements, if any, and safe reentry times,
B. On-Site Ground Contamination
There are two sources of radioactivity from a nuclear explosion,
the direct products of the nuclear reactions (the fission fragments
and tritium) and the radioactivities induced in the surrounding medium
by the explosion generated neutrons. Figure V.2 shows the significant
fission product activities produced per kiloton of fission energy as
a function of time after detonation. From these activities it is
possible to determine the amount, N, of a particular radionuclide that








analysis, it is assumed that the fission trigger is equal to one per-
cent of the total explosive yield but not greater than five kilotons
total. The amounts of the longer lived fission products produced for
four, 5 Kt fission devices are given in Table V-l
The induced radioactivities in the surrounding medium vary
as do the elements which are naturally present in the medium, As with
fission products, the induced radionuclides are neutron rich and
undergo decay by beta particle emission with or without accompanying
gamma rays-, The significant isotopes that are produced by a nuclear
45
explosion depend on the surrounding medium and in general are Ca ,
„ 55 „3 32 T 140 M 24 M 56 , A1 28Fe , H
, p , La , Na , Mn , and Al .
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ground of gamma ray-emitting radionuclides that were produced by the
nuclear detonation. This external dose rate will determine the safe
reentry time for work in the crater and lip area. Figure B-l
(Appendix B) shows the H+l hr external gamma dose as a function of
yield. For the four cases considered, the H+l hr doses are found
to be
Case 1 (5 Mt) y (H+l) = 18.5 R/hr
Case 2 (3.5 Mt) Y (H+l) = 24 R/hr
Case 3 (2.5 Mt) Y (H+l) = 28 R/hr
Case 4 (1.1 Mt) Y (H+l) = 49 R/hr
It is interesting to note that the largest yield produces the smallest
H+l hr gamma dose. This can be explained partially because the fission
trigger was limited to a maximum of 5 Kt and as the total yeild
increases the same quantity of radioactive material is dispersed over
a wider area.
The next step is to determine the decay factor required to reduce
the H+l hr gamma dose rate to the acceptable limit of 2 5 mr/hr for
a 40 hr work week. This decay factor is simply the acceptable limit
divided by the H+l hour dose above as follows:
Case Decay Factor
-3
.. 2.5 x 10
n
„- . „-4










2 5 x 10 -4
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The time required for this amount of decay to take place can
be determined from the radioactive decay curve, Figure B-2, This
time is then the safe reentry time for a 40-hour work week.
Case Reentry Time (40 Hr. week)
1 2800 Hr * 3,8 Mo.
2 3500 Hr x 4.7 Mo.
3 4700 Hr 6.1 Mo.
4 6000 Hr x 8 Mo.
The safe reentry time for the local population is based on
limiting the first year external gamma dose to 0.17R. The external
gamma dose conversion factor (EGDCF) required at time of reentry, T,















The time at which EGDCF(T) occurs is read directly from Figure B-3.
The minimum time of reentry to the radiation fields with the H+l
EGDCF
9 2 x 10"
3
' 08 x 10" 3
« 07 x 10~
3




hour external gamma dose rates determined above, for a first year
resident to receive 0.17R are found to be:
Case Safe Reentry Time (First Year)
1 5,3 x 10
3
Hr x 7 Mo.
2 5. 7 x 10 Hr % 7.5 Mo.
3 6.3 x 10 Hr -v 8.5 Mo.
4 7,4 x 10
3
Hr - 10 Mo.
Figure V.3 shows the comparison for each case of the safe reentry
times for a 40 hour/week and the first year. It should be pointed out
that radioactive decay was the only factor considered in developing
Figures B-2 and B-3 for the estimated dose rate levels. The natural
weathering processes, such as wind and rain, will result in a more
rapid decrease in the external gamma dose rate and dose than those
which are indicated. Also, the overlying body of water at surface
ground zero may filter out some of the radioactive particles and,
therefore, the reentry time estimates obtained above may be
considered conservative.
C. Off-Site Ground Contamination
1. Cloud Formation
As stated before, the off-site ground contamination is
caused by the release of radioactive materials in the downwind
fallout pattern due to passage of the radioactive cloud. The radio-
active cloud is formed from the explosion which projects earth
particles, vaporized material, and explosive debris into the
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Total Array Yield (Mt)
Figure V.3 Safe Reentry Time vs. Total Yield




the finer dust particles and air. This dust-laden air acts as a fluid
and sweeps downward and outward from the base of the cylindrical column
and is called the base surge. The main cloud, which contains the hot
gases from the explosion, rises and expands until equilibrium with the
atmosphere is reached. The escaped radioactivity is distributed down-
wind from the nuclear detonation as the particles of dust settle to
earth. Some of the radioactive particles will remain airborne for such
long periods of time that they contribute to worldwide fallout. This
worldwide fallout is not considered in this analysis,
The phenomenon of cloud formation is complex and is affected by
meteorological conditions, depth of burst, total yield, and type of
material being excavated. It has been determined that groupings of
up to five charges will interact to produce a single cloud. The
base surge cloud radius, base surge cloud height, and main cloud
height may be determined from Figure B-4 using a yield equivalent
to the sum of the yields for each case. The main cloud radius is
determined using a yield equal to the largest charge in the group.
A wet media is assumed. The cloud dimensions so determined for each
case are given in Table V.2.
Figure B-5 gives the equivalent fission yield in the cloud and
fallout as a function of total yields The fission yield for each
size nuclear explosive is first determined and then the total
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In order to determine the expected downwind dose levels,
it is necessary to develop a wind vector diagram or Hodograph , The
most probable wind conditions for the site area at the time of year
of the proposed detonation must be obtained. The direction and speed
of the winds from ground zero to the top of the cloud are the primary
factors affecting the downwind fallout pattern.
The presence of an inversion may limit the cloud height and
the presence of any precipitation could cause some of the radio-
nuclides to be washed out of the cloud. This may result in more
intense fallout or "Hot Spots" along the path of precipitation. These
effects are variable and cannot be considered in a quantitative manner
in making a radiological safety analysis. The best source of wind
information is a local office of the weather bureau or a local airport.
In all probability, an on-site wind analysis will have to be made
for the most accurate prediction of downwind fallout. In addition,
the terrain features of the area will have to be studied for possible
effects of channeling on the fallout at lower levels.
To plot the Hodograph, the cloud is divided into layers,
each of a certain thickness and representative wind vector. For


















500 (1) 0-1000 10 180
1500 (2) 1000-2000 12 190
2500 (3) 2000-3000 12 200
3500 (4) 3000-4000 14 210
4500 (5) 4000-5000 14 220
5500 (6) 5000-6000 16 230
6500 (7) 6000-7000 18 240
7500 (8) 7000-8000 20 250
The wind vector length is a dimensionless quantity defined by
. ,
- , wind speed of layer (knots) x layer thickness (m)
wind vector length = c ±-jz : —;—c
—
z
& P(knots) x Q(m)
where P and Q are arbitrary scaling factors used to provide a convenient
technique for plotting the hodograph. The wind vector lengths are
layed out end-to-end in the direction to which each wind is blowing.
The resulting hodograph plot for Case 1, main cloud is shown in
Figure V.4. Since both a main cloud and a base surge will be formed,
a hodograph for both clouds must be made. The hodograph wind data
for each case is given in Table V.3. The assumed wind data was
chosen so as not to be unrealistic and winds in this range may
reasonably occur.
3. Dose Level Predictions and Safe Reentry Times
Utilizing the data obtained from the hodograph, for the
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Scale: 1 unit = 14 knots x 1000 m
Effective wind velocity V' = 3.05
3750
x 14 x 1000 = 11.4 knots = 13.1 MPH
Effective wind direction (9) = 15 deg.
Effective wind shear (S') = 37.4 deg.
West shear = 15 deg. East shear = 22.4 deg.




Hodograph Wind Data (case 1 through 4)
Case 1
Main cloud Base surge
V' = 11.4 knots = 13.1 mph V' = 10.8 knots = 12.4 mph
6 = 15 deg. 6 = 4.5 deg.
S' = 37.4 deg. S' = 10.7 deg.
W.s. = 15 deg. W.s. =4.5 deg.
E.s. = 22.4 deg. E.s. = 6.2 deg.
Case 2
Main cloud Base surge
V' = 11.6 knots = 13.34 mph V' = 11.0 knots == 12.64 mph
G = 13.8 deg. 6 = 4.2 deg.
S' = 33.2 deg. S' = 10.2 deg.
W.s. = 13.8 deg. W .s. = 4.5 deg.















V 1 = 11.4 knots = 13.1 mph
6 = 11.0 deg.
S* = 26.5 deg.
W.s. = 11.0 deg.
E.s. = 15.5 deg.
Base surge
V 1 = 10.4 knots = 11.95 mph
6 = 3.0 deg,
S' = 10.0 deg.
W.s. = 3.0 deg.
E.s. = 7.0 deg.
Base surge
V' = 10.3 knots =- 11.84 mph
6 = 1.3 deg.
S' = 7.0 deg.
W.s. = 1.3 deg.
E.s. = 5.7 deg.
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safe reentry times can be predicted by the Weather Bureau scaling
method. This method predicts the external gamma dose rate and the
first-year dose along the "Hot Line" of the local fallout pattern. The
"Hot Line" is defined as the line in the downwind direction along
which the maximum external gamma dose rate occurs.
The basic dose rate prediction expression used in the Weather
Bureau method is:
(DR) . . dr (-^]








x t-z- 1 I YT ]
V
in which the unprimed quantities refer to a known reference case
(Danny Boy Event in Basalt) and the primed quantities refer to
values for the case to be predicted and,
DR = external gamma dose rate (R/hr)
v = effective wind velocity (knots)
s = wind shear (deg)
h = cloud height above the ground surface (m)
x = distance from SGZ (mi)
EFY = equivalent fission yield in the cloud and fallout
Figure B-6 gives the data from the Danny Boy Event required
in the prediction method. It should be noted that this Weather
Bureau scaling curve does not extend closer than about five miles
to surface ground zero. In this region, deposition of fallout results
from both normal fallout processes and the turbulent growth of the
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base surge could along the ground. Consequently, predicting dose rates
in this region is difficult. It is possible, however, to estimate the
external gamma dose in this region by extrapolation between the pre-
dicted dose at the crater lip and the predicted dose at the point five
miles from SGZ.
Since this proposed nuclear detonation will produce both a main
cloud and a base surge cloud, a fallout calculation must be made for
each cloud with the appropriate fraction of fission yield in each
cloud. It is assumed that forty percent (40%) of the radioactivity
is in the main cloud and sixty percent (60%) is in the base surge
cloud. The H+l hour external gamma dose rates for each cloud are then
summed at equal distances from the detonation point. The results of
these calculations for each case are given in Table V.4.
The safe reentry time, in days, as a function of distance from
surface ground zero for Case 1 are shown in Figure V\5. As previously
stated, the curve is extrapolated between the safe reentry time to
the crater lip area and the point five miles from SGZ. It should be
noted that the variation in safe reentry times beyond five miles
from SGZ for the four cases considered is very slight. The calculations
indicate that the downwind extent of the exclusion area would be
approximately sixty (60) miles. This is the distance at which the
external gamma dose from cloud arrival to one year will be less than
0.17R. Doubling the wind speed for case one results in an extension
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The results of this radiological safety analysis for off-site
and on-site ground contamination allow comparisons to be made of the
four cases considered. The ground contamination in the crater and
lip area was greatest for the smallest total yield considered, whereas
in the downwind fallout pattern, there was little or no difference
in contamination levels. In addition to the relative cloud sizes for
each case, comparison of the most probable wind directions and
deviations (wind shear) can be made.
This analysis is not intended to provide any predictions of
radioactive fallout for an actual nuclear detonation. The state of
any portion of the atmosphere at any particular time may be known
only imprecisely. Therefore, a radiological safety program based on
forecasts of atmospheric variables needs to provide for large
deviations from the forecasts. The Air Resources Laboratory of the
Environmental Science Services Administration has done extensive work
in the field of meteorology and nuclear detonation safety and has
published some of the more recent developments in knowledge of air
motion and in prediction techniques.
Nuclear detonations are carefully timed to occur under weather
conditions that meet safety requirements or under conditions within
which emergency measures can be taken to ensure human safety. All
detonations can be cancelled or postponed by che project manager up
to within a few minutes of the detonation time so that late changes
in weather can be analyzed.
D. On-Site Tritium Concentrations
Tritium, one of the major by-products of the fusion reaction,
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has a half-life of 12.3 years and emits a comparatively low energy beta
particle (18 Kev) . Tritium may be significant to the internal
radiation dose because it occurs mainly as tritiated water (HTO) which
is chemically indistinguishable from ordinary water (HO) . Ground and
surface water in the locality of the detonation, therefore, may become
contaminated with tritium to such an extent that a safety hazard may
exist.
In a nuclear harbor excavation, a large body of tritium con-
taminated water will be formed that may initially be isolated from
the surrounding sea by the crater lip. It is the purpose of this
section to estimate the amount of tritium that could be expected in
this contained volume for each case under consideration. An
unclassified estimate indicates that approximately 20 kCi of tritium
will be released per kiloton of total yield. It is assumed that
50 percent of the tritium produced will be trapped in the crater and
fallback material. It is further assumed that the crater formed will
rapidly refill with sea water with the tritium being equally
distributed throughout the fallback material and water inside the
crater volume. Estimating the crater volume (including fallback) for
each case, the tritium concentrations based on the above assumptions
are given in Table V.5.
The maximum permissible concentration (MPC) of tritium in water
3
to be consumed by the general public is 0,001 uCi/cm . The
calculations here indicate that the tritium concentration could be as
high as 100 times the allowable MPC for drinking water. This is not
to say that the water in the crater should be suitable for human









may enter man's food chain indirectly by his consumption of animals and
plants exposed to the contaminated water. Controlled release of this
contaminated water to the surrounding sea may have to be considered
in order to ensure that there is no safety hazard to the marine life
in the area. In addition to the possible marine hazard, tritium may
also be deposited on the surrounding vegetation. Before a complete
radiological safety analysis can be made, the relationship between man
and his environment, which involves naturally occurring ecological
concentrations and dillution processes, must be known as well as the
quantity of each radionuclide produced and its contribution to the
radiation dose. The ecological processes are difficult to estimate
since they depend on the time of year, the local climate, vegetation,
agricultural methods, and the dietary habits of both man and animals
living in the contaminated areas. Such a study is beyond the scope
of this analysis but the reader is referred to a similar study con-
ducted by the AEC for a proposed nuclear harbor in Alaska "' and other






SEISMIC AND AIR BLAST EFFECTS
A. Ground Shock Considerations
Almost all the constructive applications of nuclear explosions
depend on the tremendous pressures developed, pressures so high that
rock and earth behave like fluids. Part of the energy of the explosion
is propagated through the earth as seismic waves. Far from the source
these waves are simple sound waves, having degenerated from very strong
shock waves. For a large yield explosion, damage due to earth motion
from these waves can be very extensive near the point of detonation.
Because the destructive power of these waves decreases with distance,
it is possible to estimate zones and type of damage expected from an
4 18
explosion. ' In estimating the possible extent of damage,
consideration must be given to several factors such as, type of
medium in which the blast takes place and where structures are
located, the type of structures whether engineered or residential
and the distances from the explosion point.
The primary basis for ground shock predictions is the large
amount of empirical data which has been collected as a part of the
AEC's nuclear testing program at the Nevada Test Site. The applica-
bility of the NTS information to other geographical areas has been
verified by several nuclear events which have been detonated at
locations other than NTS. The nature of the medium in which the
device is detonated will affect the fraction of explosive energy
which is coupled into the medium and radiated as seismic
Detonations in stong, competent rocks, such as basalt or granite, are
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more efficient seismic sources than those in weaker and more
compressible media, such as alluvium and tuff. There are indications
that a cratering explosion will couple less seismic energy into a
medium than a fully contained explosion. The difference may be as
high as a factor of 2, however, this is not sufficiently documented
to warrant it being taken into account in predicting ground motion.
For this analysis, the detonation medium will be assumed as
competent rock (basalt, granite) and the medium at the point of
interest is assumed as hardrock. The equation for predicting peak





A = ~ cm/sec
R
where A is the ground acceleration, W is the yield in kilotons and
R is the distance from SGZ in kilometers. An absolute threshold
of damage cannot be defined as the severity of ground shock- induced
damage to any structure will depend as much on the type and condition
of the building as on the level of ground motion to which it is
subjected. The approximate threshold of perception (which varies
2
with individuals) is an acceleration of 1 cm/sec , An acceleration
2
of 16 cm/sec is generally an accepted level for minor architectural
2 2
damage to residential structures. Between 16 cm/sec and 100 cm/sec
there is a possibility of actual damage occurring. The percentage
of damage to a structure is assumed to vary from 5 percent of its
2 2
value for an acceleartion of 100 cm/sec to 100 percent at 2000 cm/sec"
Table VI . 1 lists the predicted distance from SGZ corresponding to these





Distance(Mi) vs. Ground Acceleration Levels (cm/sec )
A = 1 A = 16 A = 100
Case 1 (5 Mt) R = 274 R = 68.5 R = 27,4
Case 2 (3.5 Mt) R = 240 R = 60.3 R = 24
Case 3 (2.5 Mt) R = 215 R = 53.9 R = 21.5
Case 4 (1.1 Mt) R = 158 R = 39.6 R = 15.8
Based on the location of these three zones of motion and an account
of the number and types of buildings located in each zone, it is
14
possible to develop cost estimates for expected damage. These
calculations indicate that care should be taken in selecting a
proposed harbor site to allow a 15 to 30 mile radius within which
there are very few structures.
B. Airblast Considerations
In addition to the seismic waves, there is associated with any
explosive excavation project, nuclear or conventional, the possible
hazard of blast waves. There is no difference between the blast waves
produced by the two types of explosions, only the larger the explosion
the farther its effects are felt.
Relatively weak blast waves can alarm people even if no serious
damage is done. The damage caused from the blast wave of a nuclear
explosion can be very extensive and is dependent on a number of
factors. Generally speaking, sound propagation through the atmosphere
is not uniform. Numerous tests have been conducted and measurements
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made to predict theories of blast wave phenomena. The predictions
made possible by this experience are somewhat uncertain, owing to
4factors similar to those encountered in weather forecasts.
The motion of the earth above the explosion generates the air
blast wave. The three major contributions to the air-blast are the
spall, gas acceleration, and massive gas venting. Wind, temperature,
and atmospheric pressure all play an important role in the propagation
of an air blast. In addition, the air blast can be refracted off the
atmosphere and focused back to earth. This can produce a region of
increased intensity of the wave. The Jetstream winds can also affect
the distribution of the blast wave which could result in damage 150
miles away from the explosion.
The dominant airblast source mechanism (ground shock or gas
vent) follows the same trend as the dominant mechanism in the cratering
process and is peculiar to the geologic medium in which the nuclear
detonation occurs. For nuclear detonations in hard, dry rock up to
a yield of 5 kt , the ground shock- induced pulse has been dominant.
For nuclear detonations in alluvium up to a yield of 100 kt, the
gas-vent-induced pulse has been dominant. Pertinent experience does
not exist at this time for other mediae The airblast overpressures
predicted in this section are found by scaling from a standard over-
pressure-range curve for a one kt free air burst detonated in a
standard atmosphere with a zero sound velocity gradient. Only the
dominant wave is considered, with no specific indication as to
whether it is the ground shock-induced or the gas vent-induced portion
of the wave. This curve is shown in Figure C-l. Also included in
this figure are the scaling relationships used to predict the
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overpressures for other yields.
Since the scaling curve is based on a free air burst, a
transmission factor (TF) must be used to relate the overpressures
for a subsurface detonation.
T Subsurface Burst Overpressure
Free Air Burst Overpressure
Figure VI. 1 is a plot of the transmission factor as a function of
scaled depth of burst in the region of general interest for nuclear
construction applications. The scaled depth of burst for Cases 1
1/3
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Scaled depth of burst - ft/kt 1 / 3
Figure VI. 1 Transmission factor as a function of
Scaled Depth of Burst 7
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A single average yield size is used for each case to predict airblast
overpressures and the resulting amplitudes are multiplied by N
where N = number of charges in the array. The resulting overpressures
for Case 1 through 4 are shown in Figure VI. 2. The possible extent
of structural damage for various overpressures are also indicated in
the figure. Adjustments must be made to these predicted overpressures
for those expected for specific meteorological conditions. Table
VI. 2 lists some of the amplitude and reduction factors for various
atmospheric conditions.
Comparing these results and those of the predicted ground
shock-induced damage it appears that the damage resulting from ground
motion will overshadow the airblast effects. Damage resulting from
seismic and blast waves can be minimized by selecting the proper site
for an explosion (not too close to populated areas) and taking
advantage of wind direction, time of year and other factors. By
taking advantage of the most favorable conditions, nuclear explosive
excavations can be carried out safely with no undue risk to the health
and safety of the public.
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Figure VI. 2 Airblast Overpressure vs. Distance from SGZ
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The economic advantage that the use of nuclear explosives may
offer over conventional methods of harbor construction is dependent
on a variety of considerations. It is very difficult to apply a
dollar for dollar comparison to these two techniques of harbor
construction because of the many different aspects of each type of
construction and the possibility that one method may favor a different
geological siting. To illustrate this, consider the excavation of
one very large hole, say 100 feet deep and 400 feet in diameter,
constructed in hard rock. Using conventional methods of excavation
may require a combination of explosives, machinery and many man-hours
of labor to accomplish the project. By contrast, it may well be
possible to simply drill a hole and place one nuclear charge that will
excavate the required size hole, at considerable savings in time
and expense. At a different site, where the medium is a loosely
compacted silty material, the excavation may be accomplished with
earth moving equipment, or dredges if underwater, without the aid of
explosives either conventional or nuclear.
Should a project require a large quantity of explosives, then
the explosive costs themselves may influence the economic considerations
The cost of conventional explosives is approximately $A60/ton for TNT
and $120/ton for ANFL, while the cost of nuclear explosives ranges
4
from $35/ton for a 10 kt yield to $0.30/ton for a 2 Mt yield. There
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from the AEC. This cost comparison indicates that there is a trade
off point beyond which only nuclear explosives are economical and
that for small projects economics will continue to dictate the use
of conventional explosives.
Included in the cost of a nuclear excavation project are the
costs associated with drilling and casing of the holes for emplacing
of the nuclear explosives. Table VII. 1 lists the itemized emplacement
and yield costs for the four yield sizes used in this analysis.




Total Emplacement and Yield Costs for Cases 1 Through 4
Case 1 (5 Mt) 4.47 Million Dollars
Case 2 (3.5 Mt) 4.41
Case 3 (2.5 Mt) 4.36
Case 4 (1.1 Mt) 3.47
Another important advantage of nuclear explosions that would
reduce the cost of operations is that of compactness. For example,
a nuclear charge of a few kilotons would weigh a few thousand pounds
and could be placed down a 30-inch diameter hole, while a chemical
explosive of the same energy release would weigh a few thousand
4
tons and would occupy a volume of several thousand cubic meters
Considerable savings in the cost of transporting and emplacing the
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explosive would then be realized with nuclear explosives. The cost
savings of still larger explosives is even more dramatic , As stated
before, a dollar for dollar cost comparison is difficult and only the
most efficient conventional method of constructing a specific





The use of nuclear explosives for large scale excavation
projects will depend primarily on the location of the proposed
project site. To ensure that there will be no undue risk to the
health and safety of the public and also to prevent any harmful
effects on the environment, the safety implications of radioactivity
and ground shock will have to be accurately predicted. These
predictions are required in order to minimize and control any possible
dangers. For this proposed project, a site would have to be selected
in a remote area where there is little or no population or structures
for a distance of 15 to 30 miles from the site. It should be
4
pointed out that a harbor tends to speed the growth of an area-
Projects such as this in a remote area would have an accelerating
economic return as the surrounding region developed.
It was shown that from one to five megatons of nuclear
explosives will create an excavation in hard rock suitable for a
medium size harbor for approximately 12 to 14 large ocean going
freighters. The cloud height for a 5 Mt total yield will rise to
7500 meters (approximately 4.5 miles) for the assumed wind data
(10 to 20 knots), radioactivity can be spread over a distance of up
to 60 miles from the detonation point. To ensure adequate safety
precautions for the public, evacuation will be required from the
contaminated areas ranging from 7.5 months at the crater area to one
day at a distance 60 miles downwind. It was also determined that
for the smaller 1-Mt total yield, the radiation intensity was greatly
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increased in the crater and lip area, and requires evacuation for 10
months.
The radiation intensities and fallout pattern are dependent
on the actual meteorological conditions prevailing at the time of
detonation. The wind data that was assumed in this analysis was
chosen so as not to be unrealistic. In actuality, winds could
reasonably be expected to prevail that would result in radioactive
fallout less than or equal to that predicted in this analysis No
attempt was made in this analysis to relate the assumed wind con-
ditions to a specific location or region of the world = Determination
of actual on-site atmospheric conditions requires detailed and
exhaustive investigations that are beyond the scope of this paper.
The tritium concentrations in the crater and lip area were
determined to be 2 orders of magnitude above the allowable MPC for
drinking water. These concentrations will demand careful monitoring
of the surrounding vegetation, ground water, and sea life to ensure
there is no risk of unacceptable levels of tritium reaching man
through his food chain.
Ground shock disturbances for the 5-Mt total yield case will
cause extensive damage to, or total destruction of, buildings within
a radius of 27 miles. Broken windows can be expected within
approximately 70 miles. The threshold of perception may range as far
as 300 miles depending on the individual and the geologic medium.
From the results of the predicted airblast damage, it appears that the
damage caused by ground motion will be most severe.
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The cost of the nuclear explosives and drilling of emplacement
holes for the four cases considered ranged from 3,5 to 4.5 million
dollars. No attempt was made to determine the possible savings in
time and/or equipment costs that nuclear excavation may offer over
conventional construction techniques. There also exists additional
costs for environmental investigations and implementation of safety
programs required with the use of nuclear explosives that were not
considered.
In conclusion, it is apparent that nuclear explosives exhibit
an exceptionally efficient method for creating large artificial
harbors in many areas of the world with no undue risk to the health
and safety of the public. In addition, the use of nuclear explosives
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Figures A-l and A-2 are curves (based on the empirical W '
scaling law) which may be used to predict apparent crater dimensions
(R and D ) as a function of depth of burst (DOB) for hard, dry rock,
and wet, weak clay shale. These curves summarize both high-explosive
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Figure A- 2 Apparent Crater Dimensions vs. Depth of Burst for




Figure B-l is a plot of the external gamma dose rate at
H+l hr. in the crater and lip area as a function scaled DOB and
yield. In developing this curve, it was assumed that only a few
kilotons of energy from a high yield device will result from fission.
It was also assumed that the fission products and induced radionuclides
which are not in the cloud and fallout are uniformly distributed in
a volume of fallback and ejecta material equal to the volume of the
true crater.
Figure B-2 shows the variation of the ratio of the gamma dose
rate at times greater than one hour after detonation to the gamma
dose rate at H+l hr. for various yield explosives as a function of
time after detonation. Figure B-3 presents external gamma dose
data based on the time of reentry of personnel into a gamma radiation
field and on the H+l hr. dose rate at the point of interest.
Figure B-4 and B-5 show the radioactive cloud dimensions and
the equivalent fission yield in the cloud and fallout as a function
of yield. Figure B-6 is based on the data obtained from the Danny
Boy event and shows the gamma dose rate at H+l hr . as a function of
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Figure B-l External Gamma Dose Rate at H+l hr in Crater and Lip
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Figure B-2 Gamma Dose Rate as Function of Time Relative to
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Figure B-3 External Gamma Dose Conversion Factor as Function of
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Figure C-l shows the air blast overpressure resulting from
a one kiloton free air burst as a function of distance (range) from
ground zero. By using the scaling relationship shown on the figure,
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